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Friday, June 5, 2009
End strength issues at center of QDR debateAs the QDR
progresses, DSJ hears that it is end strength issues that are becoming the most challenging issues in terms of fitting
the total costs of increasing manpower into the budget topline in FY2011 and beyond. Thus to stay within
OMB's current projections, DOD may not -- indeed cannot -- allow Army and USMC end strength to reach the goals
proposed by the Bush Administration and initially accepted by the Obama Administration.
Nevertheless, the Obama Administration cannot turn its back on the global security environment if it wants to keep
the dollar strong and conduct foreign policy. Therefore, despite the Administration's rhetoric, it looks like supplementals
will continue to be used to meet O&M requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan as well as used increasingly for
funding manpower, modernization and investment accounts. That is, modernization (tactical vehicles
and C4 connectivity) and investment (littoral combat ships and UAS ISR platforms) to support the wars we are fighting
today and the most likely conflicts we'll be involved in over the next five years.
Dr. Gates will stay on on SECDEF,
all things being equal, until after the 2010 elections. He wants to protect against his plans being overtaken and torn apart by a resurgence of the Democratic left. He won't accept folks coming into the Pentagon who are more ideologically driven than they are pragmatic. Danzig, Flournoy and Carter may not be the type of people Gates
would feel good about handing the reins to, however. Bet on John Hamre to replace Gates if Gates feels comfortable with the outcome of the mid-term
elections.
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Congressman McHugh for SECARMY - more political savvy from 1600 Pennsylvania AvenueThis morning saw nine-term Congressman John M. McHugh (R-New York) nominated by President Obama to become the 21st Secretary of the Army. Mr. McHugh (60), Ranking Member
on the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), is regarded as an expert on matters defense by his colleagues on both
sides of the aisle and can be expected to sail through confirmation hearings.
Despite concerns, mostly from
the far right, that President Obama, particularly unexperienced in matters of national security, would populate the Pentagon
with anti-defenseniks, the tapping of Mr. McHugh (not to mention the decision to retain the services of Dr. Robert M. Gates)
underscores that the President and his adviser understands the importance not only of having seasoned professionals in key
leadership positions, but also the imperative to enlist the "opposition" in his efforts to fundamentally reorient
U.S. defense policies and to reform defense acquisition. (And the Dems might pick up another open seat in the process.)
Monday, June 1, 2009
Here we go again on the JSF's second engineDo we or don't we need a second engine developed for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter? With over $2 billion already
sunk in an back-up engine development that is now nearly 3/4ths complete and with the Government Accountability Office
still equivocating on the long-term efficacy of the investment, that's the question once again at hand.
On one side is the Pentagon, which argues that while a second engine
-- the F136 being developed by a General Electric/RollsRoyce team -- would be nice to have, risk has been sufficiently mitigated in the Pratt & Whitney F135 powerplant to safely forego the back-up design.
On the other side is the Congress, which has, for several years running, insisted that DoD pursue the second engine against
its wishes, arguing that the sustainment of a competitive source is not only a hedge against technical and programmatic risk,
but, in the long run, provides cost-saving competition. (Congress also argues, perhaps as a fig leaf, that the
JSF partners -- principally the U.K. -- expect the F136 to be developed and offered as an alternative engine.)
Although we have seen a change in Administration and a new outcry over Congressional earmarks since this perennial
issue was considered last year, the battle lines for the FY10 iteration of this debate are terribly familiar. Following
President Obama's fingering of the F136 development as a boondoggle, last week saw the Lexington Institute roll out an editorial referencing its study of last January that dismissed the various arguments for the F136 development. The week also witnessed F-35 Program Director USMC Brigadier
General David Heinz tell Aviation Week that if the Pentagon is again forced to fund the F136 development from its existing JSF budget, the move would
(not could) cut system procurement by up to 80 aircraft over the next five years and would (not could) drive up F-35 unit production
costs to a level that he feels could cause JSF international partners to pull back on their commitments.
And
the Congress -- with the usual talking points from industry -- is pushing back. Indeed, a 20 May hearing of the House
Armed Services' AirLand Subcommittee saw Chairman Neil Abercrombie (D-Hawaii) voice his support for continued F136 funding, citing the grounding of Air Force fighters in the 1970s due to use of a single engine, which
had problems, as one of his reasons behind supporting what he views as a "prudent" F136 engine development effort.
For its part, the GE Rolls-Royce Fighter Engine Team announced that, based on program successes, it had launched a flight clearance certification review in preparation for F136
flight testing.
With overwhelming Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, how this 21st Century
iteration of the "Great Engine Debate" is resolved -- whether or not the F136 is funded ($465 million is supposedly
needed) or not in FY10 and who pays the bill if it is funded -- will give us perhaps the best indication we are to get regarding
the success that the Obama Administration will enjoy in reforming defense acquisition.
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