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Saturday, April 25, 2009
Is a renaissance in arms cooperation in the offing?Yesterday, as the Pentagon marked the launch of the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and a (separate) Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) at a DoD press conference, some interesting comments were made by the "senior defense officials" onhand with respect to America's allies
and what appears to be their heightened prominence in DoD planning considerations. In tones that would have been tough
to conceive coming from a Rumsfeld Pentagon, it was noted that "key allies will participate in the QDR” and it
was observed that "building the capacity of partners and allies is a critical component of U.S. strategy."
Do these conciliatory comments mean that the Obama Administration
will put more priority on alliance capability development and perhaps even on cooperative R&D and procurement programs?
With Dr. Gates' plan to prepare the FY11 budget request based in part on the QDR findings, and with defense budget
pressures forcing a smarter approach to defense spending on both sides of the Atlantic, perhaps we will see more value placed
on cooperative programs -- both current efforts like the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and new developments --
moving forward. It might be too early to tell, but it not too early
to hope.
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Has the Air Force killed or stolen JCA ?Just when it looked like the Air Force got pounded and the Army made out
pretty well in Secretary Robert Gates' April 6th program "cuts and kills" announcement comes news that suggests
that the Air Force may have quietly picked the pocket of the Army. As the exceedingly well connected Roxana TIron has
reported in The Hill, another decision, unmentioned by Dr. Gates on the 6th, may cheat the Army out of C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) that
it has labored for years to field. The roots of this turf battle stretch back decades to the 1948 Key West Agreement, where the Air Force essentially secured the airlift role/mission for the Department of Defense (DoD). Since that time,
the Army has complained that its airlift requirements have been give short shrift by the blue suiters and has sought to field
its own small airlifters. When Army officials -- particularly Army Guard officials began to clamor for a replacement
for the aging C-23 SHERPA -- the Air Force wasn't interested in hearing about it... after all, lift was Air Force turf.
When the demand wouldn't go away, significant Army funding began to appear in the POM, and Congresional support emerged
for the new aircraft start (based in large part on National Guard requirements), the Air Force quiickly got interested.
The Future Cargo Aircraft morphed into the Joint Cargo Aircraft and the Army (danger, danger) had a partner.
Although the Air Force didn't have an immediate need for the JCA and the Army was ostensibly still the lead Service in
the program, the Air Force got the aircraft it wanted (the C-27J SPARTAN "baby Hercules") rather the smaller, cheaper-to-operate
CASA C-295 supposedly preferred by the Army. Now comes word from Ms. Tiron, citing anonymous Pentagon sources, that
the JCA buy will be dramatically scaled back (to a total buy of 38) and the Air Force, which never wanted a new aircraft
in the first place, will be given outright program control. If the speculation is accurate, Dr. Gates envisions
that the Army, which has already received two C-27J, has eleven others under contract, and which was originally slated
to receive 54 of the program's first 78 aircraft, will be left with nothing. If the speculation is accurate, the
Air Force stands to prevail massively over the Army in a huge, protracted turf battle over the tactical lift
mission. If the speculation is accurate, its no wonder that Secretary Gates didn't mention it on April 6th.
Our last post notwithstanding, here's betting that the Guard weighs in and that the Congress won't buy this move.
link
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Avoiding the backlash while shifting defense prioritiesWhile Secretary of Defense Gates will certainly hear from
the Congress relative to the programs that he proposed (on 6 April) to cut and kill, the reaction – the hue and cry
-- will be less than one might expect given the scope of the proposed changes. DSJ is assured by Congressional sources
that the reason for this is that the Secretary isn’t really cutting defense, but is rather realigning priorities.
With these budget-neutral machinations, the Secretary has adroitly assured that there will be relatively
small immediate industry impact (and therewith Congressional backlash and opposition) by shoring up as many programs –
with the same contractors -- as he is cutting/killing. For example: F-22 production is to be
finished, but the F-35 more robustly fund; DDG-1000 will end at three units (all at GD/Bath) but move money
to DDG-51 production re-initiation (at Northrop Grumman Pascagoula); FCS vehicles are killed, but money is protected
for this area once OSD re-examines the mission; the Airborne Laser killed, but THAAD interceptor are more robustly
funded. Look for more details when on Tuesday, 4 May, when DSJ is told that the Pentagon will forward its
Fiscal Year 2010 request to Capitol Hill.
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