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Saturday, March 28, 2009

Tapping Commercial Space Imagery -- Anything but BASIC

Tuesday's DSJ blog entry -- Missile Defense Comes Back to Earth -- described an emerging Obama Administration reorientation of U.S. missile defense programs and priorities focused on the "most likely" rather that the "most dangerous" threats. Now, seemingly on the flip side of this logic, comes word from the exceedingly well-wired Collin Clark at DoD Buzz that the new Director of National Intelligence, Admiral (ret.) Dennis Blair, is considering throwing his support behind the development of a new constellation of "exquisitely" capable and obscenely expensive remote sensing satellites. While the specifics of these high level deliberations are not known, what is clear is that some hard lessons of the recent past may have been forgotten. As DoD space segment observers are aware, the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) program was aborted in 2005 -- after some $10 billion in investment over half a decade -- with the Pentagon citing massive technical problems, innumerable delays and soaring costs. Seeing the same future looming for the NRO's Broad Area Satellite Imagery Collection (BASIC) system -- and, more importantly, believing that new commercial remote sensing solutions provided by contractors DigitalGlobe and GeoEye (and funded by the taxpayers at the tune of roughly $500 million) could meet the vast majority of all NRO requirements -- the Congress zeroed the BASIC program last year. Indeed, the U.S. Government's Commercial Remote Sensing Policy stipulates that "the Government must rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. commercial remote sensing space capabilities for filling imagery and geospatial needs for military, intelligence, foreign policy, homeland security, and civil users." Bottom line: with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Vice CJCS Gen. James Cartwright recently and repeatedly focusing on the imperative to eschew perfection in favor of workable (or “75%”) solutions, following existing U.S. policy with respect to the exploitation of commercially-available imagery -- and perhaps even tapping proven foreign capabilities where prudent -- would be a great place to start.

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Wednesday, March 25, 2009

Good Riddance GWOT

Like so many other bad choices the Bush Administration made during its time in office, choosing to call military operations aimed against violent Islamic radicals a "Global War on Terror" or GWOT was just one more mistake that had serious, negative, and long-term implications for U.S. national security efforts. The GWOT did not accurately describe what the US was worried about, e.g. was the Bush Administration worried about the existential threat to friendly nations from acts of terror on a global scale? Or, was the Administration really worried about threats emanating from a particular group which exhibited specific and identifiable cultural traits and was primarily located in a definable region? Terrorism is a tactic that threatens random harm to innocent civilians. If your country's strategists really understand the nature of war they ought to caution decision-makers and strategic communicators not to declare war on a tactic. A tactic is terribly difficult to eliminate and stopping it most likely won't end the war in question. The Bush Administration, unfortunately, did not heed those warnings and tried to play the GWOT as an invitation to play under the big tent for allies and potential partners to get everyone involved in antiterrorism initiatives in one way or another. But, as we came to see, the game Cheney and Rumsfeld played best was hide the ball, or for that matter, the detainee. In legitimately combating the use of terrorism there is indeed a place for applying military force against individuals, groups, and states. However, when using military force a country must recognize that if used alone its effects are mostly transitory and the action doesn't remove the necessity of being ready to fight over the same ground in the future. Therefore, if, as indicated, the Obama Administration intends in the use of the phrase "Overseas Contingency Operations" to describe our involvement in places where acts of terror emanate and by that to mean US policymakers and strategists will attempt to address local grievances, build the capacity for governance, train indigenous security forces, and use US military force to accomplish feasible, suitable, and acceptable goals, well that will be change we all can live with. (MJS)

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Missile defense comes back to Earth....

There's really been no doubt that with Democrats in control of the White House and both Houses of Congress, U.S. missile defense priorities would change, perhaps more than in any other mission area. The question of how quickly change would occur was answered in public this week, when, at the Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics annual missile defense conference, Marine Corps General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and Ellen Tauscher, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee's Strategic Forces Subcommittee (and nominated to be Obama Administration's Undersecretary of State for arms control and international security) made clear to the large, defense industry-rich audience that a fundamental reorientation of U.S. missile defense priorities and spending would not wait. Defending against threats "most likely" rather that threats "most dangerous" will prioritize budget allocations moving forward, General Cartwright noted. Maligning some of the more exotic national missile defense concepts that the Pentagon has funded robustly over the past two and a half decades with a goal of eventually providing umbrella protection from strategic threats, Cartwright promised that moving forward "the emphasis is going to shift to [defending] deployed forces, allies and friends." (Read: THAAD, PAC-3, AEGIS - at ease). Congresswoman Tauscher echoed the general thesis of the Vice Chief, but got more specific, fingering the boost-phase 747-mounted Airborne Laser as a likely candidate for cuts/cancellation and the ship-based AEGIS anti-missile system as a program where funding could be sustained. Bottom line: While some tough decisions on major defense programs will be kicked down the road for further analyses via the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review and FY11 budget build, it appears that the Obama Administration is ready to make some calls with respect to missile defense, and to do it in the context of the FY10 budget request in final SECDEF review.

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Tuesday, March 24, 2009

Work in Line for UnderSecretary of the Navy

Speculation has it that Robert O. Work, vice president of strategic studies at the straight-shooting Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, will be tapped by the Obama Administration as UnderSecretary of the Navy. (As reported, Mississippi Governor Ray Mabus appears to be the Administration's choice for SECNAV.) Mr. Work, who served 27 years as a Marine Corps officer, was a Military Assistant and Senior Aide to Richard J. Danzig, Secretary of the Navy under President Clinton (and is rumored as the Obama Administration Secretary of Defense in waiting). An accolyte of long-time Pentagon Director of Net Assessment Andrew Marshall, Mr. Work is regarded as a leading thinker on future defense challenges including naval transformation. An Adjunct Professor at George Washington University, Mr. Work has directed and analyzed war games for the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense; contributed to Department of Defense studies on global basing and emerging military missions; and provided support for the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. What's it mean for industry and the future fleet? Judging from his recent writings, Work bring a 21st Century perspective to U.S. naval force projection and is focused less on USN fleet size (280 and trending down?) than on its flexibility and alignment against likely projection/presence requirements. Among his expressed concerns and priorities: leveraging non-Navy U.S. and allied fleets to address common requirements; extending the range/reach of U.S. naval forces; enhancing ship-based weapons; sustaining robust Navy R&D efforts; and reducing shipbuilding and O&M costs by reducing the number of distinct ships in the fleet.

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